

*Annual Report*  
*of the*  
**SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**  
**July 1, 1962, to June 30, 1963**

## *Contents*

	Page
Chapter I. INTRODUCTION.....	105
II. OPERATIONAL READINESS.....	107
III. REORGANIZING THE ARMY.....	119
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN DOCTRINE AND TRAINING.....	123
V. THE ULTIMATE WEAPON.....	132
VI. THE SINEWS OF WAR.....	141
VII. NEW TOOLS AND WEAPONS FOR THE SOLDIER.....	156
VIII. PUBLIC WORKS.....	167
IX. CIVIL AFFAIRS.....	172
X. AIDING OUR ALLIES.....	177
XI. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.....	180

## *1. Introduction*

During the past year the United States has placed increased reliance upon its Army in the effort to achieve national objectives. To fulfill this trust, the Army has improved its combat capability and efficiency on all levels so that it will be prepared for any emergency—great or small. It has built a balanced force that can turn back aggression at the village level or on a broad front. In the process the Army has reorganized its staff and major commands to produce a better command structure. By reorganizing Army divisions according to the ROAD concept, it is providing the field commanders with flexible fighting forces that can be tailored to respond to any situation. As a result of the experience gained during the callup of the reserve components in 1961–62, the Army has also reorganized its reserves in order to furnish the active forces with better prepared reinforcements that can be utilized more swiftly.

Internal improvements have been accompanied by other changes. The Army, to carry out its mission, must have troops that are mobile and versatile. To develop these requirements, the Army has emphasized increased air mobility, special warfare training, and a far-ranging school program.

However, increased funds, modernization of arms and equipment, intensified school programs, and vigorous training in jungles, snow-covered wastelands, deserts, and swamps are only the prelude. It is in times of crisis and in actual performance that the Army's capabilities are judged. Army troops in Vietnam, advising and supporting the Vietnamese, are meeting the test. The experience gained in Vietnam is being applied to Army training programs and will provide valuable guideposts for future Army developments in countering and defeating insurgent and guerrilla activities under similar circumstances.

In the crisis over Cuba the Army successfully tested the ability of its staff machinery and logistical support system to respond to a tense situation. Under the shadow of war the Army moved men and equipment into positions from which they could be used quickly and effectively should the need arise. Elsewhere around the world there were other areas of tension, such as Berlin and Korea, which might have involved the use of Army forces under certain conditions.

Army troops are ready at home to defend the Nation against attack or to reinforce oversea forces in the event of crisis. Abroad they are part of the military shield in Europe and Asia. Together with the Navy and Air Force, they are prepared to resist aggression and to defend freedom.

Army personnel are also instructing the military forces of our allies in the use of weapons, in tactics, and in other active and passive measures to enable them to defend themselves against covert or overt aggression. In addition, the Army's long experience in building a nation through civil works and civic action is being put to increasing use as a means of strengthening constitutional governments in many of the underdeveloped areas of the world.

At the heart of the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam is the *strategic hamlet* program with its threefold purpose: To consolidate the people into strategic hamlets under government control; to recruit, arm, and train a local paramilitary force—the Self-Defense Corps—to defend the hamlets; and to win the support and confidence of the people in the hamlets through economic and materiel assistance and sound advice. By the end of the fiscal year, Army personnel had played a significant role in helping the Government of Vietnam establish nearly 6,000 of approximately 11,000 planned strategic hamlets. An extension of the Government of Vietnam strategic hamlet program has been carried out in the Viet Cong-dominated areas by U.S. Army Special Forces personnel. This program is continuing to be of significant value in denying to the Viet Cong needed intelligence, cover, personnel replacements, and logistic support.

As a complement to the strategic hamlet program, the Government of Vietnam has carried out military operations to “clear and hold” areas formerly under Viet Cong domination. Successful offensive moves against Viet Cong training bases, supply areas, and communications have allowed the Vietnam Government to gain the initiative, expand its control, and extend the strategic hamlet system. Increased U.S. financial and advisory support coupled with a rise in the size and combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Army has helped to spur the effort. Much of the credit is due to joint U.S.-Vietnam intensified action in training and developing junior Vietnamese leaders at the company and platoon level. By increasing the strength and improving the training of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, the Vietnam Army has been able to relieve many of its units from static defense assignments and use them instead in offensive operations.

In many ways, the fighting in Vietnam resembles the American Indian wars of the 19th century. There is no front, no depth to the combat area, and control is decentralized. Operations are widely scattered and—much like the old Indian raids—hit and run. There is one major difference, however, for where there was seldom any hesitation about recognizing the enemy in America, the Viet Cong forces can usually be identified only after they have committed an overt hostile act. Because of the fluidity of the operations and the ease with which the enemy can revert to peaceful pursuits after an action, mobility has become a vital factor in combating the Viet Cong threat.

To a very large degree, the ability to move quickly has been provided by the U.S. Army helicopter units serving in the Republic of Vietnam. Since the Vietnam Army did not have organic aviation, U.S. Army aviation units were assigned in direct support of Vietnam Army corps, but have remained under the operational control of the senior U.S. advisor to the corps. This system insures adequate sup-

port, quick reaction, and responsiveness to the combat needs of the Vietnamese commander. Army aviation units during fiscal 1963 flew approximately 100,000 sorties and transported 275,000 troops and 9,000 tons of cargo. As soon as a report of enemy activity was received, one or more helicopter companies, using CH-21 or UH-1B aircraft, quickly delivered reinforced Vietnamese rifle companies to the scene of the operation. These helicopters were escorted by armed UH-1B helicopters and/or by Vietnamese-manned T-28 trainers. By exploiting speed, mobility, and surprise, the Vietnamese forces have been able to strike the Viet Cong quickly.

In addition to heliborne missions, U.S. Army aviation units in Vietnam have performed many other tasks. Helicopters and larger fixed-wing aircraft, such as the Otter and Caribou, have been used to transport men and supplies to outlying and isolated installations. The OV-1A Mohawk has undertaken visual and instrument surveillance tasks and has proved to be very effective. The intelligence derived from these missions has been used by the Vietnamese in planning both ground and air mobile operations and in developing target data for artillery fires and air strikes.

The Army also has provided assistance in the form of jeeps carrying audio-visual equipment and has furnished other materiel assets to help the Government of Vietnam in its psychological operations against the Viet Cong. Army Psychological Operations Mobile Training Teams and other personnel have been working as members of the U.S. Interagency Psychological Operations Working Group in Vietnam in an effort to develop a country-wide, coordinated psychological operations plan.

Although the situation improved during the year, there are and will continue to be some failures and setbacks in the continuing struggle in Vietnam. In the meantime, emphasis under the Military Assistance Program will be devoted to providing training and advisory and logistic support to the Vietnamese armed forces. In addition, considerable effort will be given to civic action projects and strategic hamlet development.

### **The Cuban Crisis**

Closer to home than the challenge in Vietnam was the Communist threat in Cuba that developed during fiscal year 1963. When the crisis over the U.S.S.R. buildup of missiles in Cuba arose in October 1962, the Army moved swiftly to prepare for an outbreak of hostilities. On October 16 it designated the Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command, as Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Atlantic, to assist the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, in contingency planning for an assault on Cuba.

War rooms and operational headquarters went on a wartime footing in mid-October and the Army sent alerts to its forces around

the world. After President Kennedy's speech on the crisis on October 22, the Army began to move combat and support units to assembly areas. The 1st Armored Division moved on October 23 from Fort Hood, Tex., to Fort Stewart, Ga., where it would be more accessible to port facilities. Signal units came from Fort Gordon, Ga., Fort Carson, Colo., and Fort Bragg, N.C.; artillery batteries and replacement companies from Fort Lewis, Wash.; ordnance units from Fort Meade, Md.; transportation companies from Fort Eustis, Va.; hospital trains from Ogden, Utah; field hospitals from Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and Fort Bragg; and quartermaster units from Fort Lee, Va.

Nearly 30,000 troops and over 100,000 tons of equipment were moved during the crisis. Rail, highway, air, and water routings for both personnel and materiel were centrally controlled by the Defense Traffic Management Service to insure full utilization of available resources. Troop units were located near outloading ports so that they might reach the objective area quickly, should the need arise.

The Army established forward headquarters of U.S. Army Forces, Atlantic, at Homestead Air Force Base, Fla., to coordinate Army activities in the base areas, and set up the Peninsula Base Command at Opalocka Air Force Base, Fla., to provide logistical and administrative support of all Army troops in the Florida area. It directed the initial movement of these two headquarters on October 23.

To support emergency operations, the Army acquired 44 properties by lease for the Army and Air Force in the southeastern area. It prepositioned stocks throughout the base area as well as with par-



*Figure 2. The 1st Armored Division conducting landing exercises during the Cuban crisis.*

ticipating units. Based on prepositioned requisitions, Army supply and parts depots prepared items against possible future demands.

In the meantime, the U.S. Third Army executed plans for the defense of the southeastern United States and the Florida Keys. NIKE-HERCULES missile units were deployed to provide area defense against medium and high altitude targets and HAWK missile units guarded against low-level attacks. These air defense missile units occupied positions in the Miami, Homestead, and Key West areas.

The Army force remained ready until the crisis passed. Redeployment began on November 29 when the first Army unit, a signal battalion, departed for Fort Bragg. By December 20 all major Army combat units had returned to home stations, with the exception of the air defense units still defending against the existent Cuban air threat. Costs for the Army movements and preparations during the crisis amounted to \$70.5 million.

During the Cuban crisis a number of problems arose. Although they would not have interfered seriously with the Army's participation in operations, some did cause concern. Not all units committed to the operation were initially at optimum deployable strength. The deficiencies were caused by a shortage of sufficient personnel in the active Army to maintain all units and activities at full strength; by unprogrammed requirements, such as Vietnam; and by the objective of maintaining oversea theaters as near full strength as possible. The problem was further aggravated by the loss of trained personnel through expiration of terms of service and voluntary separations. As a result, major adjustments in personnel strength had to be made.

In the movement of supplies and equipment, there were some shortages in transportation equipment; these were overcome by shifting to alternate modes. A shortage of amphibious-type shipping, including roll-on/roll-off transport, and limited port capacities in the objective area would have delayed introduction of additional forces and supplies into the area; additional amphibious shipping would have permitted over-the-beach off-loading.

The shortage of Army aviators and of officers for civil affairs staffs and units was made up for the most part by temporary transfers from the most readily available sources of qualified personnel. An increased number of personnel qualified in these specialties will be required to rectify this situation.

Units committed to the Cuban plan in many instances were equipped with substitute items because of a shortage of authorized modern equipment. An example was the M-59 personnel carrier which had to be employed pending the availability of the M-113. The worldwide shortages in certain items of equipment were highlighted by the imminent implementation of a contingency plan.



During the crisis the inadequacy of communications to and within Latin America became more apparent, and orders were received to make immediate improvements. As a result, leased land lines and submarine cable circuits to Latin America have been provided and new radio facilities within Latin America have been installed.

### **Berlin**

In contrast to the Republic of Vietnam and Cuba, Berlin was relatively quiet during the fiscal year. The East German Communist regime attempted to seal off contacts with West Berlin by creating an impregnable no-man's land along the "Wall," but refugees continued to devise means for breaching or circumventing the barrier.

As visible evidence of U.S. determination to remain in Berlin, the Berlin garrison carried out a rigorous training program within the garrison area and in major U.S. training areas in West Germany. The Army placed emphasis on perfecting individual and unit skills essential to the success of the Army's mission in Berlin. Training in combat in cities, riot control, marksmanship, physical fitness, tactical exercises, and drill and ceremonies were stressed.

During the year, battle groups were flown from the United States to West Germany and then moved into Berlin as a test of strategic mobility. The 1st Battle Group, 8th Infantry; 2d Battle Group, 12th Infantry; 1st Battle Group, 13th Infantry; and 1st Battle Group, 28th Infantry, each spent about 3 months in Berlin on a rotating basis.

USAREUR troops in western Europe also trained vigorously and carried out a number of exercises during the year. Among the most important of these were: FALLEX 62, a theater-wide command post and field training exercise, which included air and ground staff participation; HIGHPOINT, a joint and combined unconventional warfare field training exercise conducted in the NATO area; and SOUTHERN EXPRESS, a field training exercise in which the Mobile Land Force of Allied Command, Europe, was deployed from Central Europe to Greece. A shortage of areas near home stations suitable for combined arms training of reinforced company-sized units, river crossings, and airborne drops handicapped USAREUR forces to some degree. The growing forces of the Federal Republic of Germany required more training space and were allocated additional range time at U.S.-controlled major training areas. Despite these obstacles, at the end of the fiscal year USAREUR troops were in excellent condition and combat ready to respond to any emergency situation.

### **Other Potentially Critical Areas**

Elsewhere around the globe, the Communists exerted pressure in Laos and India, posed a threat to Thailand, and sought to widen their

beachhead in the Americas. In Laos, the Pathet Lao carried on military operations on the Plain de Jarres and endangered the accords reached in Geneva. On October 6, 1962, the U.S. Military Assistance Command was disestablished and evacuated in pursuance of the Geneva Accords; there were no U.S. forces in Laos at the end of the fiscal year.

Across the border in Thailand, the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group and the 9th Logistical Command contained over 3,000 personnel at the end of the year. The U.S. contingent has sought to expand Thailand's economic, military, and logistic base in the event that Communist and insurgent forces should threaten the government with overt or covert aggression. In addition to improving the Thai Army's capabilities through increased advisor and materiel assistance, many civic action projects have been undertaken to improve Thai civilian living standards and relations between civilians and the military forces. For the most part, these projects were in support of programs carried out under South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) auspices and through Thai mobile development units. Over 7,000 U.S. personnel, including a brigade from the 25th Infantry Division, participated in a 25,000-man allied exercise in Thailand. After the exercise was completed, a U.S. engineer company remained to carry out civic action tasks.

As a result of the outbreak of hostilities along the India-China frontier in October 1962, the Indian Government appealed to the United States for assistance. The United States responded with a program to help India maintain its internal security and resist external aggression. The U.S. Military Supply Mission, India, was established under the military command of the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe. The Army carried the primary share of the task of administering the program and supplied about two-thirds of the personnel in the mission. Considerable quantities of materiel were delivered to India during the fiscal year.

In the Western Hemisphere the United States attempted to strengthen the bonds of friendship and understanding with its sister republics and to stiffen opposition to additional Communist inroads. In furtherance of this effort, the Army provided numerous Mobile Training Teams from its area-oriented Special Action Force to furnish advice and guidance to the Latin American republics. At Fort Amador, Canal Zone, the Third Annual Conference of the Americas was held in July 1962 under the sponsorship of USARSOUTHCOM. The conference provided an opportunity for Army leaders of the various countries in the Western Hemisphere to meet, exchange ideas, and discuss mutual problems. In May 1963, the Army participated in the removal of U.S. official dependents from Haiti during that country's internal unrest and dispute with the Dominican Republic.